{{Header}} {{Title|title= Reasonable Security }} {{#seo: |description=Definition of "reasonable security". What does the mean? }} {{maintainability_mininav}} {{intro| Definition of "reasonable security". What does the mean? }} = Introduction = {{stub}} = Miscellaneous Viewpoints = {{quotation |quote= When is a program secure enough? * Security is all about tradeoffs ** Performance ** Cost ** Usability ** Functionality * The right question is: how do you know when something is secure enough? ** Still a hard question ** Requires understanding of the tradeoffs involved * Is Internet Explorer secure enough? ** Depends on context |context=[https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=19kNRU0AAAAJ Steve Zdancewic, Professor of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania]: [https://www.cis.upenn.edu/~stevez/cis551/2006/web/lectures/CIS551-01.pdf Computer and Network Security] }} {{quotation |quote=Security is meant to prevent bad things from happening; one side-effect is often to prevent useful things from happening. Typically, a tradeoff is necessary between security and othe r important project goals: functionality, usability, efficiency, time-to-market, and simplicity |context=Dr. Bill Young, Department of Computer Sciences, University of Texas at Austin: [https://www.cs.utexas.edu/~byoung/cs361/lecture2.pdf Foundations of Computer Security, Lecture 2: Why Security is Hard] }} Coined "practical security" instead of "reasonable security" but a similar concept. {{quotation |quote=Practical security balances the cost of protection and the risk of loss, which is the cost of recovering from a loss times its probability. |context=2000: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butler_Lampson Butler W. Lampson], Microsoft, [https://www.cs.cornell.edu/courses/cs5430/2023fa/NL02.Lampson.pdf Computer Security in the Real World] https://www.acsac.org/2000/papers/lampson.pdf }} {{quotation |quote=As secure as reasonably practicable means that an incremental improvement in security would require a disproportionate deterioration of meeting other system cost, schedule, or performance objectives; would violate system constraints; or would require unacceptable concessions such as an unacceptable change in the way operations are performed. |context=[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Institute_of_Standards_and_Technology National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)]: [https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-160v1r1.pdf Engineering Trustworthy Secure Systems] }} = Qubes Viewpoint on Reasonable Security = {{quotation |quote=Creating Qubes OS has been a great challenge, especially for such a small team as ours, but ultimately, I'm very glad with the final outcome – it really is a stable and reasonably secure desktop OS. In fact I cannot think of any more secure alternative... I use the term “reasonably secure”, because when it comes to defensive security it's difficult to use definite statements (“secure”, “unbreakable”, etc), unless one can formally prove the whole design and implementation to be 100% secure. |context=Security researcher and Qubes founder, Joanna Rutkowska, [https://theinvisiblethings.blogspot.com/2012/09/introducing-qubes-10.html Introducing Qubes 1.0!] }} {{quotation |quote=In Qubes OS we took a practical approach and we have tried to focus on all those sensitive parts of the OS, and to make them reasonably secure. And, of course, in the first place, we tried to minimize the amount of those trusted parts, in which Qubes really stands out, I think. So, we believe Qubes OS represents a reasonably secure OS. In fact I'm not aware of any other solution currently on the market that would come close when it comes to secure desktop environment. But then again, I'm biased, of course ;) }} {{quotation |quote=I wouldn't call Qubes OS “safe”, however, at least not at this stage. By “safe” I mean a product that is “safe to use”, which also implies “easy to use”, “not requiring special skills”, and thus harmless in the hands of an inexperienced user. I think that Apple iOS is a good example of such a “safe” OS – it automatically puts each application into its own sandbox, essentially not relaying on the user to make any security decisions. However, the isolation that each such sandbox provides is far from being secure, as various practical attacks have proven, and which is mostly a result of exposing too fat APIs to each sandbox, as I understand. }} {{quotation |quote=Finally, even though Qubes has been created by a reasonably skilled team of people, it should not be considered bug free. }} {{quotation |quote=“We don’t make empty promises to our users that we know no one can deliver on,” he said. “We do, however, find it amusing that many security experts around the world have deemed a ‘reasonably secure’ operating system to be the most secure operating system available.” |context=Andrew David Wong (@adw), interview in Hosting Advice: [https://www.hostingadvice.com/blog/qubes-offers-security-by-compartmentalization/ Security by Compartmentalization: Qubes is an Open-Source OS Tackling the Most Sophisticated Modern Threats] }} = User Perspectives = Qubes forum discussion: [https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/qubes-os-a-reasonably-secure-operating-system/31799 Qubes OS A reasonably secure operating system?] {{quotation |quote=I think the idea behind using ‘reasonable’ is to eliminate the false promise of ‘ultimate security’ - As that is simply not exist. Even ‘security’ alone is not a well defined term, but a process to address your threat model. As that should describe your goals and the things you want to ‘protect’ from different kind of threat actors. [...] So it is reasonable secure, as there is no ultimate security. And because it is provides you the best available and feasible soultion to address a lot of security concers related to a desktop computer - but surely not all of them. |context=https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/qubes-os-a-reasonably-secure-operating-system/31799/11 }} {{quotation |quote=Yes and no, depending on whose language you use when using the word “prove”. If you’re a mathematician, you might say yes (as in a mathematical proof). In the epistomological sense, no. There’s no way in hard science to prove you are secure. You can only prove you are reasonably secure, having migitated all the known flaws. I assume this is why Qubes OS makes claims that it is a “reasonably secure OS” - not that it is a “secure OS”. It is the unknown flaws that may one day still threaten you, and there is no way to prove there are zero flaws left. |context=https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/building-a-fully-immutable-linux-os-image-fully-verified-with-your-own-secure-boot-key/34412/19 }} {{quotation |quote=[..] Note that Qubes OS is a reasonably secure OS, not maximally secure OS. [...] |context=https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/more-practical-security-for-qubes-and-more-realistic-threat-model/7349/17 }} {{Footer}} [[Category:Documentation]] [[Category:Design]]