Chris Mooney -- The Republican brain: the science of why they deny science -- and reality =========================================================================================== You will likely be made uncomfortable by this book if believe that there are intellectual justifications for your political positions and you want to belief that those intellectual arguments are not a sham and are the determining factors in the choice of your political positions. Mooney argues that there are other, less pretty factors at work in all of us. Mooney shows that Right wing untruths about history, economics, science, etc are not merely individual mistakes, but rather are coherent systems of misrepresentations that are designed to serve individual psychological needs as well as specific political and religious purposes. Actually, Mooney is claiming that we all do that, though he tries to show that Republicans are more egregious at it than liberals. This book describes some character traits that are associated with the willingness to maintain this misrepresentation of reality: (1) the need for cognitive closure; (2) dogmatism; (3) intolerance of ambiguity and uncertainty; (4) fear of death, excessive apprehension; (5) reduced openness to new experiences, new ideas, and a variety of music and art; (6) less "integrative complexity" in thinking; (7) a need for order, structure, and closure; (8) a lack of intellectual flexibility and curiosity; (9) conscientiousness and a high value placed on orderliness, neatness, structure, etc, as well as punctuality and the need to follow a predictable schedule. Mooney admits that many of these are good traits, but warns that they still must be followed with caution. The strategy of starting out with what you want to believe, then finding justifications for those beliefs without a good deal of questioning and a good deal of doubt is a risky thing to do. Republicans tend *not* to heed this warning, while liberals, being children of the Enlightenment, are at least somewhat better at it. One important question about the Republican party is whether there is any sizable group of Republicans who do not fit Mooney's definition of rigid, authoritarian, and dogmatic. And, whether that group is large enough to influence the direction of the Republican party, its voters, and its politicians. If not, and since forming a third party in the U.S., which has institutionalized the two-party system, seems impossible, we may be stuck with a dysfunctional two- party system for a long time. David Brooks, in a recent column for the N.Y. Times (January 28, 2013), suggested something similar, though it's hard to tell whether the idea is to carve off moderates from the existing Republican party or to find moderate conservatives outside the existing Republican party (possible those disaffected by extremists) or some combination of the above. Either way, (1) it's unlikely that you would get a sizable enough number to make it a viable political party in the U.S. and (2) since the extremists have more influence in primary and preliminary elections, it's unlikely that moderate Republicans would be given moderate politicians to vote for, and (3) because of existing institutions and institutionalized rules, there is little hope of breathing life and viability into such a new or splinter party. Why are Mooney's claims that there are physiological and physical differences between conservative brains and liberal brains so important? Because, if those differences are physical, then those differences can be inherited. And, if inherited, it's likely that they are not learned or acquired. And, if that's true, then the likelihood that they can be altered is very low, which should guide liberals' attempt to influence conservatives. Quoting David Brooks in the above mentioned article: "It's probably futile to try to change current Republicans." These are, after all, bedrock principles with "deep historic and psychological roots", even if you do not accept Mooney's argument that they are embedded in physiological brain structures. One important new condition is that conservatives and liberals and almost all of us have media outlets that we can, and usually do turn to that reinforce and support what we already want to believe. That is likely to increase in the future, and it makes this problem all the more difficult to solve. This is *not* a balanced change -- Those who get their news from Fox news are more misinformed. This is shown by a number of studies. Look it up. Perhaps a simpler way of viewing all of this is to say that beliefs are "sticky". They're hard to change for a variety of reasons: we're defensive about being shown to be wrong; after time, our lives are each organized around those beliefs in various ways, so that changing them would be disruptive; and as Mooney argues, there are likely physiological structures behind those beliefs, structures that would be hard if not impossible to change. What to do: (1) Be more conservative in the sense of being more firm at showing and discussing reality, scientific truth, etc. (2) Create an alternative narrative and stay with it. (3) Stop believing or accepting that the two sides are equal (equally extreme, equally wrong, equally unscientific), and act accordingly. One aspect that Mooney does not consider at length, and perhaps that he should not, is the possibility that positions held by individuals on some issues (e.g. abortion, birth control, the subjugation of women in marriage, unlimited access to weapons, evolution/creationism, and global warming science) are not intended to be rational in the sense that those holding these positions expect to provide reasoned arguments in support of them, whether are *motivated* reasoning or otherwise. In effect, some positions held by some individuals are beyond reason and argument. It's not just, as Mooney argues, that reasoned arguments are not effective because they are countered (answered) with motivated reasoning; it's that the response shows a lack of interest in giving an answer or reasons at all. Mooney (in his concluding chapter, where he gives prescriptions for liberals) recommends that liberals "find some key facts, the best facts, and integrate them into stories that *move* people". Honestly, what kind of stories does he think might move someone who believes that abortion is murder or someone who believes that creationism is true because it is needed to maintain her/his essential religious beliefs or someone who feels that gun ownership should not be restricted because of his fears of a tyrannical government? Possibly, those stories, good enough and if told often enough by enough people, might have some kind of gradual, moderating influence. But, Mooney has already explained that the targets of these stories, those who liberals need to influence, become more defensive and more resistance to change when they meet more and stronger opposition. So, I doubt that we can expect the effect of these stories to be significant. I was left by this book with the uneasy feeling that I had been given two conflicting claims: (1) Since conservative authoritarian Republicans are rigid, defensive about their beliefs, feel threatened about their ideas, are unwilling to accept new ideas, etc, it does no good to try to argue and reason with them or to try arguing them into changing their positions. But, (2) we ought to do lots more of this; we liberals should present liberal positions much more loudly and more often, even though doing so will only make those on the Right even more resistant and defensive. Reality matters. And yet, our country is suffering because a large group of citizens are ignoring it and are willing to continue doing so. 02/04/2013 .. vim:ft=rst:fo+=a: