Francis Fukuyama -- Political order and political decay
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An important part of Fukuyama's agenda is to make the distinction
between the reforms and structures that restrain tyrannical
governments and turn them into democracies on the one hand and the
reforms and designs that produce effective governments, i.e.
governments that are able to deliver services to their citizens,
protect their rights, enable them to participate in the political
process, and enjoy an improved standard of living.  Much of
"Political order and political decay" is about what it takes to make
an *effective* government, and how those conditions are produced and
how they decay or atrophy.  That's why Fukuyama spends much time on
such concepts as bureaucracy, corruption, (independent) legal
systems, government structure including checks and balances, etc.
It's also why he spends some time explaining corruption and the two
related concepts of (1) the creation and extraction or rents and (2)
patronage or clientelism.  He feels, I believe, that these concepts
are necessary for the description and diagnosis of the decay and
degrading of modern governments.

There are a number of chapters in "Political order and political
decay" where Fukuyama attempts to explain why in some societies and
nations, patronage and clientelism is so prevalent in the political
system.  He relates it to strong kinship bonds and to a low level of
trust for those outside the family.  He suggests that in some
societies, performing favors for those outside the family and even
obeying government regulations and paying taxes is viewed as
betrayal within the family because it entails costs to family
members.  Thus, in countries where patronage and clientelism are
strong, there is a societal explanation, rather than one in terms of
previously existing government institutions.  But, Fukuyama claims,
the reasons and causes of that social development have complex
historical causes.  There is no simple explanation.

Fukuyama describes how the U.S. government was reformed and how
clientelism was limited, at least, after 1880 by the Pendleton Act,
although, he says, it was a slow process and and did not take place
evenly everywhere.  Fukuyama gives a good deal of details about the
process of reform of the civil service in the U.S., and a few notes
on reform of local/city governments, too.  This process is important
to him, I believe, because it's part on his larger picture on the
formation of political order, which includes the reform of
institutions within that order, and the decay of that ordered, which
includes a story of advancing corruption and dysfunction.  Fukuyama
addresses that second part of the story, the decay, in later parts
of the book, especially where he discusses how the U.S. government
has become bound and restricted, for example, by checks and
balances.

Fukuyama feels that reform (and possibly the formation of political
order, in general) takes place only under very special
circumstances.  It may require some kind of (external) shock, such
as an assassination of an central figure, e.g. a U.S. president, or
a panic, economic depression, or war.  It may even require the use
of a political machine to drive the reforms.  Fukuyama says that
this may suggest that political machines are an essential feature of
the democratic form of government.  In the case of the Pendleton Act
and other reforms of the late 1800's in the U.S., Fukuyama says that
there were significant changes in the capitalist economic system
during that period that drove businesses and business leaders to
demand better services and reform from their governments.

There are several fascinating chapters on the development of law and
the reform of governmental institutions in China, and also about
moves toward democratization in the Middle East.

Fukuyama views the excessive influence of interest groups on
government in general and Congress in particular as a particularly
negative form of decay.  He argues that having large numbers of
interest groups does not influence Congress in ways that represent
broad public interests.  And he feels that when each interest group
attempts to gain for its own special agenda, the deliberative
mechanisms of Congress are bypassed.  Fukuyama believes that strong
influence by interest groups and corporate entities is bad even when
there are effective restrictions on corruption and the purchase of
political favors.  However, in order to make this case Fukuyama
feels that he needs to distinguish be good and bad interest groups,
which is basically the difference between groups driven by passions
and the public interest and groups motivated by their own interest
and greed.  The negative impact of interest groups, corporate
entities, and private parties willing to spend large sums to
influence Congress is exacerbated by the way in which power is
weakened when spread broadly and amplified when concentrated, which
is the collective action problem and is also described by Mancur
Olson.

The U.S. government has become a "vetocracy", according to Fukuyama;
it has an excess of mechanisms and institutions able to block
decisions and action, i.e. what we would call checks and balances.
The U.S. government has an excessive number of "veto players", i.e.
institutions that can veto or block action, far more than other
democracies.  The U.S. Federal government is designed for those who
want to get nothing done.  Two inclinations work in this directions:
(1) Americans want and their government gives them reforms that
regulate and restrict action by various institutions in their
government.  And, (2) in some state governments the initiative
process attempts to take power away from the legislature and give it
directly to voters, but by doing so, enables them to make only the
coarsest decisions without any opportunity for deliberation or
compromise.  Fukuyama, by the way, recommends a shift toward a more
parliamentary government, but recognizes that it is impossible for
several reasons: (1) in the U.S. the Constitution is a
"quasi-religious" document, in spite of the dysfunctional government
that it prescribes; and (2) reform would require many well
coordinated changes made over time as the reformers learn from each
change.  Both of these are unrealistic expectations.  The second
requires cooperative government institutions capable of making
intelligent decisions, and often compromises too; but that is
exactly what we lack and why we need reform.

Can rules, regulations, and laws replace discretion by intelligent,
well educated, and morally motivated government functionaries?
Fukuyama thinks not.

Can transparency and accountability along with good alignment of
incentives for government participants lead to a strong and good
government?  Fukuyama thinks not.  Fukuyama argues in favor of
bureaucratic autonomy in order to achieve a proper functioning
government.  And, Americans back him up when they rant about their
government being so inefficient because of all the rules and
regulations.

The last chapter of the book ("Political order and political decay";
the name of the chapter is the same as the name of the book) is a
good summary of Fukuyama's thoughts on how political systems evolve.
He thinks in terms of these stages: (1) bands (hunter gather bands,
I suppose), (2) tribal societies, (3) states, (4) patrimonial
states, (5) modern states, (6) modern state with independent legal
system, (7) modern state with emergence of institutions of
accountability.  But, he is very negative about the ability of
modern states to avoid decay, in particular what he calls
repatrimonialism and also corruption and clientelism. Specifically,
with respect to the U.S. he lists several features that make reform,
once that decay progresses, extremely difficult and impossible: (1)
a reverence for the U.S. constitution causing a political and
popular unwillingness to change even features of that constitution
that clearly cause dysfunction (e.g. the Electoral College and the
filibuster rules in the U.S. Senate); (2) the checks and balances in
our government that work to prevent change and even intelligent
decision making; (3) the clientelism and interest group politics
that results in a political system whose participants (interest
groups, corporations, and politicians, too) have a very strong
desire to keep basic institutions the way they currently are.  The
checks and balances and the number and strength of what Fukuyama
calls veto players in the U.S.  government make it more difficult to
do wrong, but also more difficult to do good, which makes reform
extremely difficult to do.

However, Fukuyama does not seem to believe that there is no hope for
reform in the U.S. government.  He seems to believe that reform
might be possible, but only with the help of an "external shock",
such as the assassination of president James A. Garfield in 1881,
which provided the energy for the reforms of the Pendleton Act.
Perhaps something similar could happen again, although the
assassination of a president is not something I'd wish for.

It's helpful that Fukuyama writes in a clear style.  For the most
part, each paragraph in "Political order and political decay" makes
a single point, and it's usually clear what that point is; and often
each paragraph ends with a footnote intended to backup that point.

There is much more to this book: it's a long book, and Fukuyama is a
deep and methodical thinker and writer.  It's also a fascinating and
important book, if you are willing to take some time reading and
thinking things through.

11/19/2014

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